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Abstract
Policy-makers have recognised that changing travel behaviour is important. People however
do not change their behaviour so readily, particularly the use of the car. A central concept
that has been invoked to account for this has been the concept of habit, however, various
studies also present people as having concrete reasons for driving: their choices are
intentional. This interdisciplinary study attempts to reconcile these two understandings of
travel behaviour by drawing on insights from the philosopher Anscombe and a growing body
of travel research termed the mobility biography literature. It applies some of Anscombe’s
insights from Intention to the act of driving. With regard to the mobility biography literature, it
draws out conceptual implications both from theoretical and empirical aspects: in particular,
the characterisation of travel decisions as nested in a hierarchy of life decisions and the
association of life events with changes in travel decisions. It concludes that a broader
conceptualisation of human behaviour leads to a broader view as to what policy-makers can
do. It reminds us that transport is ‘special’, that transport and policy are inextricable, and the
importance of infrastructure provision should not be ignored.
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1. Introduction
Transportation makes up a significant share of total energy consumption and greenhouse-
gas emissions and is dominated by the use of the private motor car (Anable et al., 2012).
Significant attempts have been made to reduce private car use, but usage remains
significant, though in some parts of the world it is becoming less so. In other words, it has
been acknowledged that it is apparently very difficult to change people’s travel behaviour or
choices. Various concepts have been deployed to account for this perceived difficulty. One is
that of ‘lock-in’, with a related notion of ‘path-dependence’. The idea is that transport is
indeed ‘special’, uniquely involving as it does the investment of costly, systematic and,
crucially, sunk infrastructure. Once installed, this transport (and also land use) cannot be
easily reversed, if it can be reversed at all (Whittle et al., 2019). Related to this is the notion
of ‘car-dependence’: once a society has been configured for the convenience of private
motorists, conducting one’s life without using a car becomes more or less impracticable; one
then comes to ‘depend’ on a car (Whittle et al., 2019).
What these concepts have in common is that they explain resistance to change (or inertia)
by primary reference to the external environment a person might find themselves situated in:
that within which they might try to meet their needs. Another perspective, however, focusses
on the mental, cognitive or psychological phenomena that occur; these being internal to  a
person rather than external to them, as with the built environment and infrastructure.
Scholars adopting such a perspective, recognising that travel behaviour could be properly
described as a form of repetitive, routinized activity, have invoked the concept of habit to
explain why people resist changing their behaviour. Roughly, as people repeat a particular
type of behaviour or action over time, it becomes ‘script-based’ (Verplanken et al., 1994) and
automatised – an unthinking response to a certain cue. Behaviour is seen as undeliberative,
unconscious and akin to an impulse, though scholars are careful not to identify habitual
responses as exactly identical to impulses.
Such a perspective seems to be in accord with our lived experiences: not only with regard to
driving, but other, routinised behaviours such as cleaning, exercise, and eating. However, it
would seem to be at odds with a body of scholarly literature which makes clear that people
have reasons for driving or using a car. Choice theory, for example, posits the individual as a
utility-maximising agent (Lucas et al., 2011); qualitative approaches make clear that drivers
not only have reasons for driving, but are clearly aware of their reasons for choosing the car
(Gardner and Abraham, 2007).
A tension between these psychological perspectives is clearly evident. This research will aim
to address it by using an interdisciplinary approach, discussing insights from the monograph
Intention of the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe as well as a body of research which has
come to be termed as the mobility biography literature.
This article will be structured as follows: In Section 2, it will review the literature and elucidate
counter-perspectives. Section 3 will present the philosophy of Anscombe in Intention with a
prelude on the philosopher Wittgenstein, who greatly influenced her approach to philosophy.
Section 4 will draw out relevant insights from the mobility biography literature. Section 5 will
reflect on aspects of the interdisciplinary approach. Section 6 discusses and concludes.
2. Literature Review: Intentional and habitual decision-making.
2.1 Intentional Decision Making
The question about the positions that the concepts of intention and habit occupy in the
domain of human behaviour – and, indeed, of what they even mean – has occupied scholars
and researchers from a huge range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology and
neuroscience (Pollard, 2003, Gardner, 2015, Schwanen et al., 2012, Barandiaran and Di
Paolo, 2014). In the field of transportation research, two perspectives have tended to
predominate, informed by two tremendously influential theoretical frameworks: the Theory of
Planned Behaviour (TPB) and the Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (TIB).
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen (1991) was originally developed as the
Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) and has a
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strongly rationalist, deliberative conception of human behaviour. It coheres with theoretical
frameworks both from economics and (neuro)psychology. It does so with regard to
economics – and particularly expected utility models – in taking it as axiomatic that people,
when faced with a range of alternatives, select one with the best behavioural consequences.
People choose the best available option; they maximise (expected) utility (Lucas et al.,
2011). Such as exposition does not as such provide a psychological description of how
people make decisions; one of the TPB’s key principles, however, does: which is that the
immediately prior and determinative antecedent of any action is an intention, as is also
argued to be the case in psychology and neuroscience (Mele, 2009). An intention is
influenced by three factors: beliefs about the consequences of their actions, normative
beliefs – normative expectations of important reference groups or people, and beliefs about
how much control they have over their the action – the efficacy with which they can translate
action into results. In the specific case of transport, it would be postulated that people
deliberatively weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of each of their travel choices,
and choose the one they decide to be the best.
The Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (TIB) was introduced by Triandis (1977). It has a very
similar conceptual structure to the TPB; but it has two significant augmentations. Firstly, it
introduces the following constructs as additional determinants of behavioural intention: roles
(hence, ‘interpersonal’), self-concept, and emotions. Secondly, a dynamic or temporal
dimension. It agrees with TIB that intention precedes action, but only in situations that are
new or unfamiliar. It diverges in positing that, if the setting in which decisions are made
remains stable over time, an association between goals and behaviours is reinforced so that,
eventually, the behaviour becomes an automated response. On this understanding, habits
can be defined as: “goal-directed behavioural patterns which have become sufficiently
associated with specific cues as to be initiated automatically” (Verplanken and Aarts, 1999).
This does not however mean that habitual action is reduced to the level of an impulsive
reaction; it is distinguished by virtue of being undertaken to fulfil a goal (goal-directedness).
2.2 Alternative perspectives on habitual behaviour
 The TPB and TIB have been widely used in transportation research; their parsimonious
specifications lend them directly to quantitative modelling techniques with relatively large
sample sizes, in particular the structural equation modelling (SEM) technique, and as they
have been specified with their specific constructs, have had success in accounting not only
for behaviour in general but also transport behaviour (Bamberg and Schmidt, 2003, Forward,
2004). This is unsurprising because both perspectives appear to capture fundamental
insights that seem unarguable and certainly strongly relevant to the case of transport
choices. Transportation choices involve costs that are significant and would surely involve
some sort of deliberation. Yet it would seem equally true that real-world choices do not
involve deliberation at each and every turn.
The predominance of these theories has prompted critiques and counter-critiques, both from
within the theoretical background and outside it (Sniehotta et al., 2014, Ajzen, 2015).
Consequently, other scholars have sought to suggest alternative perspectives on travel
behaviour. In particular, social practice theory has argued that excessively privileging
cognitive phenomena misses things out: rather than having the deliberating, rational
individual as the focus for any inquiry into social phenomena, it would be better to use that of
a ‘practice’ and its elements (Shove, 2010, Shove et al., 2012). Relevant to low-carbon
mobility, Schwanen et al. (2012) also argue that existing conceptions of habit tend to neglect
the role of active agency, and argue that to understand habit one must go beyond the simple
‘Cartesian’ conception of the contemplative individual.
This research article aims to contribute to this debate in aiming to shed light on conceptual
issues surrounding the notions of intention and habit. It will next go on to discuss the work
Intention of Anscombe, as well as a recent body of research in the transport literature,
mobility biography.
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3. Anscombe’s Intention
Elizabeth Anscombe’s monograph Intention is arguably one of the most significant
philosophical works of the twentieth century, so much so that philosopher Donald Davidson
termed it “the most influential account of action since Aristotle” Stoutland (2011). It effectively
launched the field of philosophy of action. Since Anscombe’s Intention, alternative accounts
of the concept of intention have been proposed, not only including Davidson (1963) but also
Bratman (1987) . Nonetheless, interest has begun to return to Anscombe’s work, with new
scholarly attention and publications, perhaps reflecting the work’s enduring insights.
Before examining Anscombe’s arguments in Intention, it will be helpful to discuss another
philosopher who had a profound influence on her: Wittgenstein. This is because Anscombe’s
book is perplexing and challenging, both in its style and organisation. Based on a series of
lectures, Intention does not follow a clear, linear path: it begins with a short investigation of
the concept of ‘intention’ as such, and then, finding that fruitless, focuses on the concept of
‘intentional action’, reaching its central and defining sentence, its definition of intentional
actions: “the actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the
sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.” Teichman
admits that this seems quite arbitrary: no justification is given for this definition, no
background explanation is given as to how she has reached this formulation, and Anscombe
says that her answer is merely suggested, rather than asserted.
Wittgenstein is fruitful here for two reasons. content and style. As regards the first,
Wittgenstein’s seminal Philosophical Investigations (PI) (1953) contain aphoristic comments
relating to intention that despite their cursoriness, began a huge amount of research on
intentionality, indeed inspiring such philosophers and scholars as Anscombe (Hacker, 2000).
One of his points, relevant to the philosophy of psychology, was that when we speak of
someone intending or meaning something, we do not so by reference to any thought-
processes or ‘ostensive’ acts (mentally directing one’s attention to a given thing). Intentional
verbs thus “do not signify phenomena.” (Glock, 1996). This is firstly because intentional
verbs do not have ‘genuine duration’; they:
- “Cannot take a course, unfolding in different ways
- Cannot be spot-checked or observed continuously
- Cannot be clocked by a spot-watch
- [Are] neither interrupted by a break of consciousness or a shift of attention, [nor]
endure continuously.” (Glock, 1996).
Secondly, and more fundamentally, because mental or physical processes or states “are
neither necessary nor sufficient for believing, intending, or meaning something.” (Glock,
1996) It may well be allowed that there be empirical correlations between such phenomena
and intentional attitudes that might inform psychologists about ‘subconscious’ or
‘unconscious’ intentions, as far as the concept of intention is concerned, they do not
“determine the content of intentional attitudes: what someone intends or means.” As Hacker
(2000) argues: “just as willing is not a mental act or event that precedes acting voluntarily, so
too intending is not an antecedent mental act or experience (feeling, thought, or sensation)
that precedes acting intentionally.” Likewise, he argues that intention is not:
- A sensation or feeling,
- A mental act or activity engaged in,
- Thinking,
- An experience,
- An accompaniment of action.
It is simply that there is a category difference between mental phenomena and intentional
attitudes as concepts. What this means is: if the essential feature of intention is no longer
held to be an ‘intentional thought’, and that of habit its, absence, the putative dichotomy
between intention and habit breaks down altogether. Stating that an action has been
performed out of habit, or as a matter of habit, does not license one to rule out that it was
performed intentionally.
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The second point relates to style. As earlier noted, Intention has been acknowledged as a
difficult read: it is hard to make sense of what Anscombe is trying to do and how she justifies
herself. However, when one considers Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy, this is made
easier. Ultimately, being a philosopher, Wittgenstein’s concern – and, indeed, Anscombe’s –
is all about concepts. Rather than propounding a particular philosophical theory, however,
Wittgenstein is distinguished by his particular methodological approach, the influence on
Anscombe of which is clearly evident. Some elements of this style can be described as
follows. Concepts are not prior to language; language is prior to concepts; a language is
presupposed by the very existence of concepts; concepts are only possible within language.
Concepts, moreover, are tools, linguistic tools: their meaning is in their use as tools within
language. And the concepts that we use are concepts in our language, and our language so
happens to be full of irregularities, quirks, and nuances. Any philosophical investigation into
the meaning or sense of a particular concept must therefore describe how it is used in
language. The following quote from PI (109) describes well Wittgenstein’s approach to
philosophy: “And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything
hypothethical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description
alone must take its place” Wittgenstein’s approach in PI is therefore to gain a surview or
overview (Ubersicht) by looking at a concept from different perspectives (Hacker, 1996),
travelling ‘over a wide field of thought, criss-cross in every direction’ (PI, preface). Anscombe
in Intention also adopts this circumnavigatory aspect, but rather than taking snapshots of a
landscape from various angles, her approach seems more akin to tracing – defining, even –
the borders of a particular territory. Thus, in Intention, she could be said to be, painstakingly,
navigating the scope or domain of the concept of intention, with all its irregularities, singular
qualifications, awkward exceptions, and particular cases. She makes use of discrete
examples case-by-case, and the appeal to ‘wider circumstances’ in clarifying the sense of an
expression. She is also happy to make rough generalisations and to acknowledge grey
areas of language, a language which, as Wittgenstein noted in his earlier Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, has its ‘enormously complicated tacit conventions’. However, while
Wittgenstein’s account is aphoristic and for the most part negative, saying what we can’t say
about intention, Anscombe’s is positive, saying what we can. Anscombe also uses
Aristotelian conceptual architecture to buttress the notion of intentionality she propounds –
an highly un-Wittgensteinian move. Stoutland (2011) summarises it well in saying: “it is fair to
say that Anscombe read Wittgenstein in the light of Aristotle, and Aristotle in the light of
Wittgenstein – and then went her own way.”
Returning to Anscombe’s formulation of intentional actions as ‘the actions to which a certain
sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of course that in which the
answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.’ If this account of intentionality is accepted,
then it becomes clear that any cognitive, mental, deliberative mental processes
instantaneously prior to an act do not actually figure in intentional action. It cannot be ruled
out that an action performed habitually without a rational deliberation preceding it can be
called intentional. Even if someone is performing an action out of habit, not directly paying
attention to what they are doing or even performing it on auto-pilot, as long as one can
subsequently ask them ‘Why?’ and they then give their reason for having acted, their action
would count as having been intentional. This would certainly seem to apply to the case of
driving the car, as observed by Gardner and Abraham (2007). In fact, Anscombe later on
points out that answers to ‘Why?’ need not be specific reasons for their corresponding
actions to count as intentional: “I don’t know” and “No particular reason” can, in some cases,
be perfectly valid answers. Thus, intentionality and habituality (understood here in the sense
of an unthinking, repetitive, triggered response in a stable decision setting) are not antitypical
to each other; this is because they do not sit on the same conceptual plane. In fact, far from
being antitypical to each other, they may, as far as the case of travelling by car is concerned,
run in the same direction. That is, unreflective habituality may simply be the flip-side of
settled intentionality.
 In addition, Anscombe, like Wittgenstein, argues that the mere presence of an antecedent
mental event, thought, or process is not a criterion for intention, although her argument is
more general and applies to any criterion that only concerns itself with what happens at or
before the intentional action takes place. Her arguments are different, however. One point is
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that intentionality is not about a particular feature that accompanies an action which thereby
distinguishes intentional actions from non-intentional actions by their absence, in the way
that two mechanically identical cars would be distinguished by the stamp of their marques, or
two switches distinguished by being on or off (i.e. the quality of ‘intentiousness’). Her critical
point is that intentionality is a form of description, and that actions can be intentional under
some descriptions and not intentional under others. For example, John might board a train
(intentional action); this might also be describable as an unintentional action (John boarded
the wrong train), an involuntary action (John’s left leg twitched while he boarded the train)
and a non-intentional action (John’s leg muscles moved in accordance with certain electrical
impulses). The point with this is that intentionality is not an ‘objective’ or ‘discoverable’
feature of an action as such: it is rather how we characterise a situation depending on what
our point of interest is of it. If we accept that this, then her argument is that it could not be
some feature is as follows: if it were some feature, nothing about that feature could
determine the content of the particular description of the intentional action. It would just be by
happy accident, which would be unsatisfactory: surely we would not only want there to be a
relationship, but an effect. If we commit ourselves to saying that what ‘stamps’ the action
with the mark of intention is something that can only be found by reference to the present,
then it would be impossible for anyone who was clearly seen to say that they did not know
what they were doing, without lying. If it were not a ‘stamp’ or a ‘style’, but still was some
feature of the action done at the time it was done, and therefore without any relevance to
anything taking place to the future, then we end up with a very thin concept of intentionality:
it means that, for example, the whole point of criticising someone for their motives is gone.
Anscombe’s insight that an action can come under various descriptions has further
relevance. She gives the famous example of someone pumping poison in a well in order to
kill some people. This action can come under four descriptions: pumping one’s arm up and
down (A), operating the pump (B), replenishing the water supply (C) and poisoning the
people (D). All of these actions could be said to be intentional: yet the question arises as to
which is the intention with which all these actions are performed? Anscombe’s answer would
be that it is D: the intention to poison the people; this, she says, “swallows up” all the other
intentions. The relevance of this to the case of driving would seem to be as follows. When
someone drives – say – drives to work, what they are doing can also be said to come under
various descriptions. They are physically operating the car (manipulating all of its physical
functions), they are actually driving the car, or they are, more broadly speaking, going to
work. So-called ‘activity models’ do in fact simulate and predict people’s travel patterns by
making the work or activity the basic function that people try to meet, and they schedule their
trips and vehicles etc. based on this (Timmermans and Zhang, 2009, Zhang et al., 2005,
Kang and Recker, 2009). Such a view of car use and travel in general as purely being a
‘derived demand’ undoubtedly would fail to do justice to the complexity of real-life, because
people do have strong attachments to cars in their own right and may enjoy travelling in its
own right (Mokhtarian and Salomon, 2001). Nonetheless, if the ‘derived demand’ case is
considered, we might think that not all ‘intermediate’ descriptions of the action involve some
process of deliberation.  Consider the use of tools (toothbrushes) or obviously utilitarian
vehicles like tractors and forklifts, which are no more than an intermediate means to the
broader goal. Thus, it might be perfectly reasonable not to expect the actor to have a
particular ‘intentional thought’ for, at the very least, intermediate descriptions of the action
(i.e. “I intend to change gear, “I intend to use my car today”, etc).
What sense, then, can be made of the notion of actions that are both intentional yet
performed out of habit? Anscombe’s response would be that ‘the question does not normally
arise whether a man’s proceedings are intentional’ – which is why it is frequently ‘odd’ to call
them that. For example, we would not usually say of someone that they crossed the road
intentionally; yet this doesn’t mean that this would not be an acceptable example of
intentional action. Indeed, when we ask someone whether they did something intentionally, it
is usually because, for example, there is some doubt as to whether they knew what they
were doing. The default is that people act intentionally, or, as Anscombe says: “Roughly
speaking, a man intends to do what he does. But of course that is very roughly speaking.”
(Section 25)
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4. The mobility biography literature
The second disciplinary approach through which the concepts of intentional and habitual
travel behaviour will be considered is the mobility biography literature  (Chatterjee and
Scheiner, 2015, Lanzendorf, 2003). More properly considered a methodological perspective
than a theoretical framework, it is related to the broader ‘life course perspective: “any point in
the life span must be viewed dynamically as the consequence of past experience and future
expectation as well as the integration of individual motive with external constraint.” (Giele
and Elder, 1998). Central to any study of travel behaviour with such an approach is the
consideration of peoples’ life courses in their entireties.
The earliest contribution particular to transport was by Salomon and Ben-Akiva (1983), who
developed much of the conceptual elements and applied them to quantitative data. They
deployed the concept of a ‘life-style’, defined as “a pattern of behaviour under constrained
resources which conforms to the orientations.” According to their conceptual framework, the
decisions households made in their lives were structured hierarchically, coming into the
following three categories: life-style choices, mobility choices, and activity and travel choices.
Life-style choices were in the supreme category at the top of the hierarchy, and related to
such questions as to family formation, participation in the labour force, and orientations
towards leisure. Below this, mobility choices were concerned with the choice of where to
work and live and whether or not to own a car. At the bottom of the hierarchy were day-to-
day activity and travel choices, such as the decision to walk or drive to work. Choices in each
category are assumed to be made jointly, and are conditional or determined by those higher
in the hierarchy, although Scheiner (2007) argues that lower-category decisions could in
theory take priority over higher-category ones.
Without touching directly on intention and habit themselves, it becomes clearer that this
framework implies a rather different and more complex picture of intention, deliberation and
action than the linear models. Instead of the solitary, discrete, standalone and determinate
travel choice made in isolation, people could in some sense be said to be making choices
between configurations of life styles which might have some indeterminate outcomes. Thus it
is not as such a question of mode choice on an individual basis; it could be, for example,
between Job A, House X and a seasonal railway ticket, and between Job B, House Y and a
car. Indeed, even travel decisions are not to be considered in isolation of each other: in
particular, the adoption decision and the daily usage decision, which is reflected in travel
forecasting studies which use simultaneous equation modelling techniques. People do not,
as such, make travel choices standalone: these choices are conditional on actually having
adopted a car (or having purchased a travel card) in the first place. Another point to make is
that of a very different relation between intentional thought, and deliberation, and action. It is
probably reasonable to surmise that people do not necessarily have clear intentions of what
sort of life styles they want; indeed, of what jobs they want and how they will then make their
travel choices. They may take much time deliberating over what they really want before
taking action.
As regards its methodological rootedness in the person’s entire life course, it implies that we
should expect travel behaviour to be in some sense habitual anyway; some scholars in this
field of research have explicitly agreed that travel behaviour best comes under that
description (Lanzendorf, 2003). The nature of life and its rhythms: daily life, quotidian life – it
should be expected to be routine. Insofar as transport decisions are considered to be a
subset of life decisions and are to be made in conformity to its dictates, we should indeed
expect them to exhibit the very regularity and routineness we would find in the rhythms of life
(Axhausen et al., 2002). Psychological processes and deliberation are not actually that
central, and should not be expected to be that central, to the question of day-to-day car
usage as such.
Another implication which seems to emerge and which mirrors something previously
discussed is that travel is for the most part a derived demand, being dependent on the
higher-order life decisions. In short, the view that transport is a means to other ends. It then
could be said to make it reasonable to call travel behaviour both intentional and habitual in a
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similar way to Anscombe, just in a way that is explicitly applied to transport. In one sense,
yes, they did drive to work, but the relevant choice might have been for the place of work.
Taking the chain of ‘Why?’ questions even further, as with Anscombe, one might find
answers such as: ‘To support my family’/ ‘It was just the job I needed’ etc, with the car use
being merely a resultant given.
Another insight that appears to emerge from this framework is that a household can be in a
position where they appear constrained, ‘locked-in’, and do not have any reasonable
transport alternatives to the car, but that this is because of rational choices and, indeed,
voluntary commitments, not because of a constraining or coercive force of habit. Indeed, this
recalls back the definition of “a pattern of behaviour under constrained resources”. Some
recent research has examined the phenomenon of ‘transport poverty’, wherein households
do not have a ready or viable alternative to the car, even if it means using significant shares
of their income on travel alone, to the detriment of their welfare (Lucas et al., 2016).
Nonetheless, the nature of the household decision-structure, with the long-term life-style
choices, and medium-term mobility choices, implies that households will indeed make
substantial, costly, commitments which may be difficult if not impossible to reverse, but
which are nonetheless rational, intentional and wanted. In other words, how people might
perform travel behaviour routinely and unreflectively, 'resist' change away from this routine,
and yet would agree that they do it intentionally.
Related to the previous point is the idea that intention, or, indeed, commitment, may long
precede the action or series of actions that may take place. For example, someone may
accept a job position which starts twelve months later and which also involves a significant
relocation away from their existing home. They envisage a long commute and prepare to buy
an economical diesel commuter. Thus, in the interim, they continue commuting with their
existing petrol-powered car; as the job move approaches, they eventually sell their petrol and
commute by electric bike as a stop-gap measure. Finally, they make the move and commute
by car every day without really thinking of it. This repetitive, unconscious behaviour would
probably be reasonably described as a travel ‘habit’, but it took place without any repetitive
build-up and no particular deliberation or intentional thought need have preceded the act of
driving. Thus, intentional thought is not necessarily to be expected. It must be pointed out
that, as Schwanen et al. (2012) note, no single action need have been ‘determinately’
performed.
A final point is that having a view of habit which includes intentionality (or, at the very least,
does not exclude it) means that we have a different understanding of what might be involved
in behaviour change. The idea of habit being anti-intention, or an anti-correlate of intention,
or beyond the field of intention, or of intention fading away as habituality secures its
stronghold, has it implied that, essentially, one must fight impulse with impulse. It presents a
rather passive picture of people, them effectively being these inertial automata who must be
acted upon from outside, without consideration of their life plans and projects. The change of
external circumstance, or an external ‘shock’ or ‘nudge’ is what is proposed to change
people’s behaviours. If however we accept the hierarchy of life choices as reasonable, then
actually the truth is that intentionality and rationality never really leave: in that people might
be expected to have some idea of what they want with their lives, however vague, even if
they are not reflective of them at every instant. The mobility biography literature has found
‘life events’, such as changing a job or having a child, to be associated with the number of
cars in a household (Clark et al., 2015, Clark et al., 2016). Life events are then proposed as
causing behaviour change, or as windows of opportunity to encourage behaviour change.
However, an alternative interpretation which bears intentionality in mind is rather that the
people themselves ‘originated’ the life event, such as the child birth or change of house or
job – and then changed their travel behaviour (although it need not always be the case – e.g.
someone being forced to move house). That is, apparent changes in habits do not happen
with intentionality absent from the picture, changes were not necessarily due to external
actings upon people, but could have been because of the person’s very own intentions (they
originate from the people themselves).  As another example, the London Olympics, an
unplanned-for ‘shock’ which cannot be reasonably said to have figured in household’s
rational life plans, did result in changes in travel patterns, but most households reverted back
to their usual travel patterns, reflecting perhaps their longer-term conceptions and intentions
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about what sort of lifestyle they might have wanted (Transport for London, 2013) (this does
not however mean they needed to have explicitly thought of this question, nor that they must
have conceived of their ‘lifestyle’ as a single, unitary thing).
5. On interdisciplinarity: a reflection
This section reflectively discusses what is was like to perform interdisciplinary research,
drawing two intellectual disciplines together.
One difficulty involved was getting to grips with Intention itself, which is acknowledged as
obscure and challenging even by specialists. This was helped by the growing secondary
literature, and also by simply taking the time to read (and re-read) it slowly and patiently.
Defining the limits of what was to be discussed was also difficult, because diverse points of
discussion seemed frequently to emerge. It is noted that methodologically, this paper did not
go into great depth with the concept of habit – and did not attempt to define it as such. It is
felt that this was justified, as it seemed the treatment of intention was also justified, and
Wittgenstein’s brief mentionings of ‘habit’ in PI seems simply to take for granted that the
meaning of habit is to be understood depending on the circumstances. This is in fact the
point that his notion of ‘family resemblance’ makes: a given concept or term can have
various senses which, like members of a family, may have certain similarities and
differences. Thus, a driving habit is to be contrasted with a smoking habit, an exercise habit,
etc. At any rate, a full conceptual investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.
One surprise was how relatively smooth a transition was to be had from a discussion of
Anscombe to the mobility biography literature, and how Anscombe’s insights could be
interspersed into arguments relevant to the mobility biography literature, supporting points
made. Rather unexpectedly, it was felt that both disciplines had two common features.
Firstly, they paid attention to people’s lived lives as such (or, in Anscombe’s case, their lived
languages). Neither approaches were strictly theoretical, distinguishing themselves by their
methodological features, with the mobility biography literature giving a concrete application
to the transportation context. These may explain why it was felt that coherence was possible
when these two perspectives were combined.
It should also be noted that the argument of this paper is not that deliberative behaviour is
irrelevant: deliberative behaviour will probably become more important in the future, because
of the advent of Mobility as a Service (MaaS), where it is conceived that people face a menu
of travel mode choices. It is conceivable that people in the future would deliberate over their
options. The point is that as far as the concept of intention goes, deliberation or thought prior
to action is not a criterion for calling an action intentional.
6. Conclusion
This paper used an interdisciplinary approach to examine the concepts of intention and habit
as have been deployed in transportation research, drawing on the philosophy of Anscombe
in Intention and the mobility biography literature. It argued that it is reasonable to speak of
behaviour in general and travel behaviour in particular as being intentional and also habitual,
and gave illustrative examples of the senses in which this might be said to be the case.
Although this purely conceptual point might seem to be a distinction without a difference, its
significance appears to be far from trivial. A minor point is that by eschewing a strict
dichotomy between intention and habit, we have a logically consistent basis for keeping the
doors open to policy interventions which presuppose that human behaviour is described by
either one of those concepts. Thus, we prevent ourselves from ruling out certain policy
interventions which would be irrelevant if we argued that the concepts were mutually
exclusive. There is however a deeper point. To deny of an action that it is intentional has
broader logical consequences than immediately apparent. Without intentions, there are no
reasons. Without reasons, we cannot speak of persuading people, appealing to their
interests, objectives, and goals. We are led to an image of passive inertiality, wherewith
people can only be changed from the outside, be it by their being transplanted into a new
setting or by a colliding impulse which jolts them off their preordained and predestining path.
This leads to the collapse of agency that Schwanen et al. (2012) have critiqued.
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An even broader point has been made here than merely to challenge the dichotomy: it is a
challenge of what might be termed a Cartesian picture of total mental priority, which restricts
one into such narrow conceptual categories. Its view, in sum, is that mental events, activities,
and processes have total priority as far as explanation and conceptual clarification goes. Or,
if you want to know what is going on, you have to, first of all, look inside people’s heads. This
leads to the narrowness of which Shove and Schwanen, amongst others, have raised issues
with. In the transport context, an excessively cognitive focus (i.e. on mental phenomena and
processes), and choosing a picture of a contemplative agent presented with a menu of
options, would seem to mean focusing on ‘instrumental-hedonic’ attributes, such as cost,
speed of travel, comfort (Batra and Ahtola, 1991). These are agential attributes, framed by
reference to first-person psychology and motivation. And, crucially, because they are framed
in terms of the first-person perception or evaluation of the travel choice, they do not directly
relate to things in the broader picture which in particular the mobility biography framework
brings out: jobs, housing, and, crucially, transport infrastructure, which might all be said to
have their equivalents in the ‘materials’ of Shove’s social practice theory. If one now
considers that people make whole-life choices, that housing might supersede transport in
importance, that these sort of choices might involve some sense of long-term, relatively
irreversible commitment and that these choices are certainly intentional, though not in the
same way as other choices, then the importance of infrastructure emerges clearly, in a way
that it doesn’t with more mentalist perspectives. One might even say that a lot of the
instrumental-hedonic attributes are in fact derivative of the extent of the infrastructure, and
certainly not the other way around: infrastructure (which actually need not be limited to
transport infrastructure but could include the entire gamut of housing and land use) has
explanatory priority. Due to the systematic, non-linear, and layered nature of infrastructure,
however, it is difficult to focus the node of explanation of transport actions to a single point;
and that is certainly not the aim of this paper.
Once infrastructure is allowed its due importance, the responsibility of policy becomes
apparent. As transport economists recognise, transport is ‘special’: like energy, it exhibits
peak and off-peak demand, network effects and constraints, and, crucially, it depends on
infrastructure for its provision (Button, 2010). Insofar as the extent of infrastructure provision
has remained mostly the prerogative of policy-makers – again, not only including roads and
railways, but housing and other buildings – transport is utterly inextricable from policy. A
mentalist conception of decisions, insofar as it obscures this importance of wider
infrastructure via its focus on agential deliberation, therefore understates the importance of
this issue, concentrating on relatively smaller-scale actions that centre on the agent’s
psychology. An historical assessment will reveal that the role of policy in infrastructure, and
transport more widely, has been far from passive or inert: it has been contingent, deliberate,
and, if this word be allowed, intentional (Gunn, 2018). It is not by any means suggested that
there are easy answers to the problems in transport, but by casting a light on the importance
of infrastructure in addition to individual motives as such, it is hoped that policy-makers will
be encouraged to take a broader view of possible remedies.
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